In this chapter we argue that, in spite of its decline and changing forms, religion still plays an important role in explaining the political participation of migrants. In addition, we suggest that the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants varies according to the context in which they live. More specifically, we hypothesize that the ways in which the local authorities deal with cultural and religious difference and the place of religion in the public sphere mediate the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants. Thus, in the following we address these two questions: (1) To what extent does religion have an impact on the political participation of migrants? (2) To what extent does the institutional context that characterizes the receiving society influence the relation between religion and the political participation of migrants?
We shall deal with these two questions in the first part of the chapter, in which we elaborate on the relation between institutional approaches to citizenship and immigration, and the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants. The second part of the chapter then presents the results of our analysis aimed at examining the impact of religion on the political participation of Christian and Muslim migrants as well as the role of the institutional setting therein. To do so we compare four cities that differ in the political opportunity structures offered to migrants for their political participation and, more specifically, in the ways the local authorities deal with religious difference: Barcelona and London tend to adopt a pluralist approach towards cultural group rights leaving space for religious difference, while Milan and Zurich follow a culturally monist approach requiring the assimilation of migrants into the receiving society (see Figure 3 .5 in Cinalli and Giugni, Chapter 3 in this volume). We suggest that such differences in the local context interact with the religious origin of migrants to mediate the impact that religion has on their political participation. In order to show that, we shall compare the two main religious groups among migrants in the four cities we are studying: Christians (primarily Catholics and Protestants) and Muslims. We argue that the mediating role of the context should be particularly important for Muslim migrants as they lack the legitimacy to intervene in the public affairs of the receiving country, while Christian migrants will benefit from the European Christian tradition to achieve the legitimacy to become politically involved. Specifically, we expect Muslim migrants to be more involved in politics in settings characterized by a pluralist approach towards cultural group rights. In such contexts, Muslim religious institutions and associations are able to foster the political participation of migrants, while in assimilationist contexts religion should have no impact or at least a smaller one on participation.
Religion and the political behaviour of migrants
Religion has been found to impinge upon political behaviour and, more specifically, political participation in different ways. Different theoretical approaches have been proposed in the extant literature, but we can broadly distinguish between three main theoretical perspectives which focus on different mechanisms. The civic voluntarism approach and the social embeddedness approach both focus on the individual resources available to members in religious institutions that have a positive impact on political involvement. Other approaches focus on collective resources such as identity and group consciousness to explain the link between political involvement and religious institutions. The civic voluntarism model maintains that churches can increase the level of civic skills, political efficacy and political knowledge. Verba et al. (1995) found that churchgoers are more likely to be engaged in political activities. They also found that different churches (Catholic and Protestant) develop different levels of civic skills. The level of political participation thus depends on the frequency of attendance to religious services, but also on the denomination of the church one belongs to. Religious life can foster social and political participation. Participation in church-related associational life provides the social contacts and organizational skills necessary to understand political action and to exert effective influence. Church involvement can provide opportunities to practise civic skills (organizing a meeting, contacting government officials, taking and defending specific bargaining positions among committee members) that can be applied to political life. Religious life, hence, has been found to promote civic behaviour outside the institutional life of the church (Tate, 1993). The various activities associated with church life tend to spill over into other aspects of civic life.
In a somewhat similar perspective, the social embeddedness approach argues that churches matter insofar as they function in a way that is similar to civic associations (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). In other words, churches play a key associational role that plays out in political life. Even in an epoch of secularization and individualization that has diminished the role of religion in society, churches remain crucial social institutions in the lives of many people. Participatory behaviour in politics is usually positively related to individuals' engagement in their churches. In this perspective, the crucial importance of churches is not that they inculcate civic skills, but that they serve as important channels of political information and recruitment (Ammerman, 1997). This approach posits that religious institutions can play a more direct role in mobilization; instead of merely increasing the level of civic involvement, they can also serve as direct channels of political mobilization. In other words, churches influence political participation by directly recruiting their members into the political process (Djupe and Grant, 2001). These studies stress that the role in the community and the networks associated with religious institutions have an impact on the political involvement of churchgoers. Religious institutions have the potential to act as agents of political mobilization and intermediaries between the individual and the state. Similarly, church members are more likely to be involved in politics and display higher levels of political commitment and activity. Finally, other scholars explain the link between political involvement and religion through socio-psychological effects (Calhoun-Brown, 1996) . Churches bring together people with similar experiences and thereby instill a group consciousness that empowers political participation. Calhoun-Brown examined the mechanisms structuring group identity and political participation. She found that politicized Black churches fostered a sense of group consciousness by collectivizing the interests of the subgroup in an effort to counter prejudice and discrimination from mainstream society. In this perspective, resources favouring political participation are collective resources based on identity and awareness of prejudice against minorities.
The role of the context
In spite of the different mechanisms of influence suggested by the approaches reviewed above, all of them agree on one point: religious service attendance and membership matter for political participation. We will examine whether this holds for the groups of migrants in our four cities as well. In line with the main thrust of this volume, we will stress in particular the role of membership in religious associations and how this may lead migrants to be more active politically. Most of the existing works examine the impact of religion in general, not specifically for migrants (Cadge and Ecklund, 2007 ). Yet, a number of authors have looked more specifically at the role of religious institutions in the political participation of migrants (Levitt, 2008) ., 2005) . The first dimension refers to the formal requirements for the acquisition of citizenship and distinguishes between an ethnic conception of citizenship and a civic-territorial one. The second dimension deals with the recognition of cultural difference and distinguishes between a cultural pluralist approach and a cultural monist or assimilationist approach. Multicultural countries (such as Britain and the Netherlands) recognize cultural difference and sometimes even promote it. On the contrary, assimilationist countries (such as France, Germany and Switzerland) expect migrants to assimilate to the majority culture. The combination of these two dimensions yields country-specific sets of political opportunities for the public intervention in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. Cross-national variations in the political mobilizations of migrants are explained by the political legitimacy as well as the public resonance and visibility these opportunity structures give migrants to intervene in the public sphere of the receiving country. Thus, a country having a more exclusive way of conceiving citizenship may exclude migrants from the majority political community. Migrants would thus feel less legitimized to intervene in political issues in the receiving country and their claims (or claims addressing their position in the receiving society, for that matter) would have less public resonance and visibility.
If we take this perspective seriously, the ways in which the state deals with cultural difference and the legitimacy stemming from them should be taken into account when studying the political participation of migrants. The role that religion plays for the political participation of migrants may be mediated by the context in which they are embedded and may also vary across religious groups. Specifically, Muslim migrants face different opportunities to mobilize through religious institutions from Christian migrants. Religious institutions and, even more, institutions from 'imported' religions (such as Islam in Europe) need to have the legitimacy to be politicized and to intervene in the public sphere.
Let us spell out this in some more detail. We argue that religion plays a role for migrants' individual political participation, but that this role is mediated by the context in which migrants are embedded. In other words, the role of religion will vary depending on the institutional approach to immigration and minority integration that prevails in the context in which they live. We hypothesize that, despite the decline in the overall levels of religiosity and the social change related to secularization and individualization processes, religion still plays an important role in explaining the political participation of migrants in European cities. However, such an impact will depend to a large extent on the context in which migrants are embedded. The role of the context will be even more important for Muslim migrants. Christian migrants will benefit from the European Christian tradition to achieve the legitimacy to become politically involved. We thus expect Christian religious institutions to have the same impact in all contexts. Specifically, we expect religious service attendance and membership in religious organizations to be positively correlated with political participation. Muslims, in turn, will need to gain greater legitimacy to become politically engaged. The impact of religion for Muslim's political participation will depend on the context in which they are embedded. In settings characterized by a pluralist approach towards cultural group rights, Muslim religious institutions and associations will have accumulated the legitimacy to intervene in the public sphere and will thus be able to foster the political participation of migrants. Religion will thus play a positive role for the participation of Muslim migrants who attend religious services and are members of religious associations. In contrast, in contexts characterized by an assimilationist approach, religion should have no impact or at least a smaller impact on participation.
Comparative framework and operationalization
We test our hypotheses against the data collected in four of the European cities included in the LOCALMULTIDEM project: Barcelona, London, Milan and Zurich. We focus on these four cities because of the differences they display in the ways in which local authorities deal with cultural difference. Barcelona and London are rather similar in this respect, as they tend to follow a pluralist approach, whereas Milan and Zurich display a strong assimilationist one. Thus, we can assess the impact of different political opportunity structures in terms of the institutional treatment of migrants. In addition, while London and Zurich are two cities that have traditionally received immigrants, immigration is a more recent phenomenon in Barcelona and Milan. Although the recent debate about Islam and radicalism is present in all these countries, London and Zurich dealt much earlier than Barcelona and Milan with religious pluralism. The longer presence of religious minorities might influence the relationship between religion and political participation. Religious groups that have a longer experience with the local institutions and political system may be more integrated and thus be more politicized than religious minorities with a shorter period of residence in the receiving countries. to migrants who settled more recently. Furthermore, the longer presence of religious minorities might also have an impact on the ways the receiving society deals with religious pluralism and allow religious minorities to express themselves in the public sphere.
In each city, three migrant groups have been selected according to their size and religion ( We test our hypotheses with regression analyses on two dependent variables: overall political participation, and participation in protest activities. As nonnaturalized immigrants do not have voting rights in all the cities under study, we considered only political activities accessible to all respondents and thus excluded voting. Both indicators were constructed with responses to the following question: 'There are different ways of trying to improve things in society or to help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you for such reasons done any of the following?' Respondents were then presented with a list of 13 different forms of political action (see Morales, Chapter 2 in this volume). To assess the overall political participation of migrants we created a dummy variable that indicates whether a respondent has participated in any of these political activities (1) or not (0). In addition, we also look at a more specific form of participation, that is, participation in protest activities (wearing or displaying a badge, sticker or poster; signing a petition; taking part in a public demonstration; boycotting certain products; deliberately buying certain products for political reasons; or taking part in a strike) and proceed in the same way by creating a dummy variable of whether the respondent has engaged in any protest activities (1) or not (0). The reasons to look additionally to protest activities are twofold. First, given the debates on Islam and the claim that Muslims are more radical than Christians, this will allow us not only to assess whether Muslims are indeed more radical, but also the extent to which Muslim religious institutions that are often decried as being the source of Islamic radicalism indeed favour more radical forms of participation. Secondly, scholars looking at the role of religion at the individual level have focused so far on overall political participation rather than on protest activities in particular (Verba et al., 1995; Wuthnow, 1999 ). Yet, different factors might predict involvement in different forms of political engagement as some are more costly for individuals to engage in. Finally, the literature on social movements has shown that the context is an important predictor of the level of mobilization of migrants, particularly in the case of protest (see Kriesi, 2004 and Meyer, 2004 for overviews). By analysing separately the overall participation and involvement in protest activities we will be able to test whether the impact of the context also holds for participation at the individual level.
We include in our models three indicators relating to religion: religious denomination, attendance at religious services and membership in religious associations. First, to test whether religion has an impact on the political involvement of migrants and whether this effect is mediated by the context we run separate analyses by denomination, for Muslims and Christians. 1 Because of the non-exclusion of religion from the public sphere in cultural pluralist cities and the opportunities these cities provide to migrants to mobilize on the basis of their religious identity, we expect the religious indicators to have a greater impact in these contexts than in assimilationist ones. Secondly, to examine the role of the individual dimension of religion for political participation, we include in our analysis the frequency of attendance at religious services.
2 Attendance at religious services is a traditional predictor of political involvement in the literature (Wuthnow, 2002), and we expect people who attend more frequently to be more involved in political activities.
Thirdly, membership in religious organizations allows us to assess the degree to which the civic dimension of religion plays a role in explaining levels of political participation. More precisely, we look at membership in religious associations. Whereas attendance at religious services relates directly to churches and their link to political participation, this second indicator relates to church-related associations; it excludes churches or mosques themselves. Members of religious associations are expected to be more politically active than non-members. Indeed, religious associations can provide individuals with the same resources that favour political involvement than churches, that is, civic skills and group consciousness.
Respondents were asked about their membership in 18 types of voluntary associations, including membership in religious associations. We assigned a value of 0 when they are not members of a religious association and 1 when they are. In addition, we also consider membership in other types of voluntary associations. This allows us to control for the impact of general associational involvement that could make any effect of religious associational engagement spurious. We, thus, assigned a value of 0 when respondents are not members of any voluntary association and 1 when they are members of at least one association, excluding religious organizations and political parties.
Finally, we include in the analysis as control variables the respondent's age, 3 gender, and educational attainment, 4 which are commonly used in the political participation literature, as well as the command of the language of the country of residence, 5 which is an important control when it comes to the political participation of migrants.
Political participation and religion among Christian and Muslim migrants
Before we turn to the regression analyses aimed at assessing the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants, we present descriptive analyses of the main dependent and independent variables. More specifically, we examine, on the one hand, participation in the various types of political activities and, on the other hand, attendance at religious services as well as membership in religious organizations in the four cities according to the religious denomination of migrants. We start by examining the degree of engagement in political participation in general and in protest activities by Christian and Muslim migrants in the four cities (Table 10 .2). Focusing on overall political participation (that is, engaging in at least one of the various specific forms during the 12 months preceding the survey), there are no consistent patterns across cities. Moreover, there is no significant difference in political participation between Muslims and Christians within cities. The only notable difference is in the general level of political participation of migrants. Migrants in London and Milan show a rather low degree of political participation ranging from 10 per cent of migrants involved in political activities for Christians in Milan to 15 per cent for Muslims in London. The level of political involvement is much higher in Zurich and Barcelona. Whereas around 20 per cent of migrants are involved in political activities in Zurich, almost 40 per cent participated politically in Barcelona. The most striking result in this respect, however, is the overwhelmingly higher degree of political participation of migrants in Barcelona. However, this figure must be related to the higher level of migrants' participation in general in that city when compared to the other three. In fact, if we take into account the participation level by the autochthonous, we can see that in both Barcelona and London there is very little difference between them and migrants, whereas the gap is much larger in Milan and Zurich (see Morales, Chapter 2 in this volume).
Yet, the most interesting aspect is perhaps the one pertaining to protest activities, as Muslims are often decried, especially in the popular press and in certain political milieus, as being intrinsically more contentious and radical, to the extent of becoming 'potential terrorists'. These figures clearly show that this is not the case. In most cities there is no significant difference between Christian and Muslim migrants and, in sharp contrast with common views, in Zurich Christian migrants are much more often involved in protest activities. Furthermore, the participation of Muslims in political activities (as that of Christians, for that matter) varies widely across cities. Far from being an intrinsic characteristic of Islam, political radicalism or, in any event, the willingness to engage in protest activities, depends on particular features of the political system.
Turning to the religious indicators (Table 10. 3), we observe important differences in the frequency of attendance to religious services, both across religious denominations and across cities. In all four cities, Muslim migrants are significantly more likely to frequently attend religious services than Christian migrants. At the same time, however, in all four cities Muslims are also more likely than Christians to never attend religious services. 6 It should be noted, however, that comparing Christians and Muslims with respect to this indicator is quite problematic. First, a given frequency of attendance does not have the same meaning in terms of religiosity for the two religions. For example, someone who attends a religious service once a week might be quite religious for Christians, but not for Muslims. This bias is in part avoided by the fact that the category indicating the highest degree of religiosity in our variable include both those who attend once a week and those who attend more than once a week. Secondly and perhaps most importantly, Muslims might be very religious even if they never attend a religious service, as the everyday prayers are most often done privately. This is much less frequent among Christians. Concerning membership in religious organizations, there is a more consistent pattern across cities. In all four cities, Christian migrants are systematically more deeply embedded in religious voluntary associations than Muslim migrants. At the same time, it should also be stressed that organizational involvement among migrants is in general quite low, never reaching 10 per cent (Christians in London) and sometimes being less than 1 per cent (Muslims in Milan).
The impact of religion on political participation and protest activities
The descriptive analyses have shown relevant variations across cities and between groups in the level of political participation of migrants as well as in the religious indicators. To explore the link between political participation, religion and the institutional context we run binomial logistic regressions on two dependent variables (general political participation and protest activities) for Christian and Muslim migrants, respectively. 7 We focus in particular on the impact of the two religious indicators (attendance at religious services and membership in religious organizations), and control for overall organizational membership, interest in the politics of the country of residence, gender, age, education and command of the language of the country of residence. We first present the results for the indicator of overall political participation, and then for protest activities.
The first two sets of models deal with the overall political participation of Christian and Muslim migrants in the four cities under study (Tables 10.4 and 10.5). Although they are not entirely consistent, the results support our hypothesis that the interaction between the political context and religion explains the political participation of migrants. Specifically, they suggest, first, that religion plays a role for Muslim migrants but not for Christian migrants and, secondly, that such an impact is mediated by the citizenship models. As we can see, neither of the two the religious indicators is statistically significant among Christian migrants, except for attendance at religious services in London. In contrast, we observe a significant effect of membership in religious organizations in the case of Muslim migrants in London, and a consistent and sizeable positive coefficient for Muslims in Barcelona, although it is statistically not significant due to the reduced number of respondents who are members of religious associations in that city. These results suggest that religion does play a role in explaining the political participation of migrants but only in culturally pluralist contexts and only through religious associations. In such contexts different identities than the majority identity can be expressed in the public sphere. Furthermore, religion is not excluded from the public sphere. Groups or actors organized along different identities are thus legitimated to intervene in the public domain on the basis of these identities. Muslims can thus organize along the lines of their religious identity but can also make claims on this. We expect to find a similar pattern when we focus on protest activities with a strong impact of membership in religious associations. Associations have been shown to be central actors in the mobilization of social movements and are thus central for mobilizing individuals in protest activities. With some qualifications, the results confirm our expectations (Tables 10.6 and 10.7). While the two religious indicators have no effect on participation in protest activities by Christian migrants in all four cities, we see a statistically significant and strong effect from membership in religious organizations for Muslims. Again, this effect can be observed only in London and Barcelona. It confirms the central role played by associations for mobilizing individuals in protest activities and the mediation of the context. It is worth noting that the observed impact of membership in religious organizations both on general political participation and on protest activities by Muslim migrants in London and Barcelona remains, even when we control for the effect of overall organizational membership. Indeed, one might suspect that the latter, which is the strongest and most persistent predictor of the political participation of migrants, is responsible for the effect of the more specific involvement in religious associations. However, the effect of membership in religious organizations is in this case additional to that of organizational membership more generally. Furthermore, the effect of religious organizational membership remains when controlling for political interest. We interpret this result as an indication that religion and, more specifically, religious associations serve as a vector of resources necessary for political involvement and more specifically for protest activities. Yet, whether these resources are civic skills or group consciousness still remains an open question, but religious organizations do play an important role in 
Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants. Our point of departure was the idea that, in spite of the fact that many have stressed its decline and transformation in the western world, religion still plays a role for the political participation of migrants.
At the same time, we argued that such a role depends on certain aspects of the institutional context such as the models of citizenship and the political opportunities stemming from them. More specifically, we hypothesized that the ways in which the local authorities deal with cultural and religious difference and the place of religion in the public sphere mediate the impact of religion on the political participation of migrants. We tested these arguments with survey data on Christian and Muslim migrants in four cities. The findings provide some support for our hypothesis, suggesting that religion indeed plays a role in the political participation of Muslim migrants, at least as far as membership in religious organizations is concerned. These results may seem to contradict previous findings on the impact of religious service attendance on civic and political involvement (Wuthnow 1999). Nevertheless, these studies do not control for membership in religious associations. In his article examining religious involvement and social capital, Wuthnow (2002) shows that, analysed separately from attendance, membership, but not attendance at religious services, is positively related to social capital. Our results are consistent with these findings and suggest that resources, be it civic skills or group consciousness, necessary to political involvement are provided by membership in associations rather than by attendance at religious services. The explanation of such a different effect of membership in religious associations and religious service attendance might be found in the fact that many mosques are mere places of worship where no activities providing people with civic skills are undertaken and where no political issues that could provide group consciousness are addressed. Thus, people simply attending religious services do not have access to resources favouring political participation. In contrast, such resources seem to be available through membership in religious associations. It is more likely that people with certain interests and skills become members of associations and that the involvement required by associations as well as the type of activities developed within associations provide their members with skills or consciousness favouring political participation.
Our results also point to the difference in the role of religious associations for migrants from different religions. Membership in religious associations does not increase the political participation of Christian migrants. This suggests that religious associations in which Christian migrants are involved develop activities mainly oriented toward the private sphere and that Christians' intervention in the public sphere would be favoured by other types of associations. In contrast, Muslim migrants are increasingly organizing around their religious identity in Europe and some Muslim associations are agitating for their members' political, social and economic rights (Soysal, 1997).
Furthermore, and more interestingly, this impact seems indeed mediated by the context, as it is observed in the two cities that deal with cultural and religious difference according to a more pluralist approach (London and Barcelona), but not in the two cities (Zurich and Milan) that opt for a more assimilationist approach. The modes of inclusion of migrants in the nation-state and the place of religion in the public sphere determine how and to what extent migrants can participate politically. Koenig (2005) finds a convergence in the development of multi culturalism and the inclusion of religion as a legitimate category of identity. In contexts favoring multiculturalism, religious organizations thus have a legitimacy for intervening in the public sphere. As religious identities are not recognized as a legitimate category of identity in assimilationist contexts, groups organized on a religious basis have less legitimacy for intervening in the public sphere. Religious organizations can thus address political issues of the country of residence and encourage their members to participate. In contrast, in assimilationist contexts, where religion is assigned to the private sphere, there is no such opportunity for religious institutions or organizations, especially for 'imported' religions such as Islam.
However, if our results give some support to our hypothesis, they do not indicate which mechanisms lay behind the relationship between membership in religious organizations and political participation. As mentioned previously, the literature distinguishes two different mechanisms: the civic skills model and the group consciousness model. But these two
